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BERTCH

v.

Socr.AL WELFARE DEPT,

F. No. 19232.

In Bank.

[45 C.2d

Nov. 15, 1955.]

HARRIET JANE BERTCH et al., Appellants, v. SOCIAL
WELFARE DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
Old Age Security-Administrative Proceedings--Notice and
Hearing.-Gov.
§ 11501, declaring that the procedure
of any state agency shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the chapter on administrative adjudication "only
as to those functions to which this chapter is made applicable
by the statutes relating to the particular agency," and enumerating as "included agencies" the Department of Social Welfare
and the Social Welfare Board, applies only when made applicable by the statutes relatmg to the particular agency
involved, and W elf. & Inst. Code, § 104.1, relating to hearings
by the Social Welfare Board, contain the controlling procedure
with respect to notice and hearing before such board of applications for old age assistance under the Old Age Security Act.
[2] Id.- Administrative Proceedings- Notice and Hearing. Where petitioners for old age assistance under the Old Age
Security Act were given an opportunity to be heard before
a hearing officer of the Social Welfare Board, and such
officer's report was then reviewed by the board, there was
no denial of procedural due process of law.
[3] !d.-Administrative Proceedings-Mandamus.-On petition
for writ of mandate to review an administrative order of the
Social Welfare Board with respect to an application for old
age assistance, petitioners are not entitled to a trial de novo
in the superior court where they do not possess a vested
right, but the right to make application for old age benefits
provided that they are able to comply with the statutory
requisites therefor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 2160 et seq.)
[4a, 4b] !d.-Eligibility to Receive Assistance.-The need of an
applicant necessary to qualify for the benefits of the Old
Age Security Law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 2000 et seq.) is the
absence of actual receipt of support by the applicant from
[1] See Cal.Jur., Old Age Security, §§ 5, 6; Am.Jur., Social
Security, § 39 et seq.
[4] See Cal.Jur., Old Age Security, § 4; Am.Jur., Social Security, § 40.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Old Age Security, § 10; [3, 5]
Old Age Security, § 14; [4, 8] Old Age Security, § 6; [6] Old
Age Security, § 5; [7] Old Age Security, § 7; [9] Old Age Security,
§ 9; [10] Old Age Security, § 2; [11] Old Age Security, § 11.

Nov.

BERTCH

SomAL

DEPT.

525

[45 C.2d 524; 289 P.2d 485]

relatives and
the property limitations of the
law.
!d.-Administrative Proceedings-Evidence and Findings.-A
finding of the Social Welfare Board that any grant of old age
security benefits would not be devoted to the
needs
of the applicants but to the work of church is not Rlrnnnv1r.Prl
by testimony that they needed "wctuu~<.
special diets, dentures, ueanu«
receiving from the church.
[6] !d.-Alienability of Right to Assistance.-!£ applicants for old
age assistance are otherwise qualified for benefits under the
Old Age Security Act, it is immaterial and irrelevant for
what the money is spent, and if they choose to turn it over
to a religious institution in return for which they receive care
at a lower level than if all the money were spent for food,
clothing and the like, the Social Welfare Board may not place
a monetary value on the satisfaction such applicants may
receive in having their spiritual needs fulfilled.
[7] !d.-Persons Eligible.-Aged persons who are under no eontract for life care with a church and are free to leave the
church whenever they desire, and who live in a seminary which
is not supported in whole or in part with public funds, come
directly within the provisions of W elf. & Inst. Code, § 2160.5,
relating to aid to an inmate of a home or institution.
[8] !d.-Eligibility to Receive Assistance.-A person is not ineligible to receive old age assistance merely because he may
be receiving $16 or $18 a month from a church, since the
church is not obligated to provide such support. (See Welf.
& Inst. Code,§ 2160, snbd. (e).)
[9] !d.-Support by Relatives.-Both the letter and spirit of the
Old Age Security Law clearly show that only the receipt of
support from responsible relatives should render the applicant
ineligible for benefits under it.
[10] !d.-Validity of Statutes.--The care and relief of aged persons who are in need is a special matter of state concern, and
enactment of the Old Age Security Law, based on a broad
social policy, does not constitute a gift of public money within
the constitutional prohibition.
[11] !d.-Administration Proceedings-Determination of Need.While the question of "need" for old age assistance is one of
fact for the Social Welfare Board, the Legislature has set
the standard of need and the board must act in accordance
with the statutory definition.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Albert C. Wollenberg,

Judge. Reversed.
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Proceeding in mandamus to review au administrative order
of the state Social Welfare Board. Judgment denying writ
reversed.
Howard B. Crittenden, Jr., for Appellants.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond 1\1. Momboisse,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
CAHTER, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the
superior court denying a petition for a writ of mandate to
review an administrative order of the State Social Welfare
Board.
Appellants, at all times here pertinent, have been and are
members of a religious society named Christ's Church of
the Golden Rule. The members of the church live together
in a seminary or home owned by the church, located in the
city and county of San Francisco, and share with each other
everything they possess. In the petition it is alleged that
they receive the necessities of life to the extent of an average
of $17 per month from the religious society although the
society is not obligated to so provide such necessities. Appellants were in residence at the seminary at the time they
applied for old age security benefits which were denied.
(One of the original petitioners left the church and is now
receiving benefits under the Old Age Security Act.) Petitioners then applied for aid to the boards of supervisors of
the various counties from which they came, under the proeedure set forth in the Welfare and Institutions Code, and
from the denials thereof, each petitioner filed an appeal with
the Social Welfare Board (W elf. & Inst. Code, § 2181.1).
The board appointed a referee to hear the appeals. A hearing
was had at which petitioners were represented by counsel.
The referee submitted his findings to the board; the board
denied the appeals. Petitioners then filed a petition for a
writ of mandate in the Superior Court of the City and County
of San Francisco, seeking a review of the matter both as to
the law and the facts.
The basic question involved on this appeal is whether or
not petitioners are "needy" persons within the provisions of
the Old Age Security Act. It is conceded that they all possess
the age and residence qualifications set forth in section 2160
of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Before discussing the
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question of the need of petitioners, however, several preliminary matters must be first disposed of.
Petitioners argue that certain findings of the hearing officer
were changed by the board without notice to them or an
opportunity for them to be heard. They point to no specific
finding which was changed. Petitioners contend the procedure outlined in section 11517, subdivisions (b) and (c), of
the Government Code, should have been followed; the board
contends that the procedure set forth in sections 104.1, 104.2,
104.3 and 104.5 was the proper method. [1] Preliminarily,
it should be noted that section 11501 of the Government Code
provides: ''Extent to which procedttre conducted pursuant
to chapter: Agencies included. (a) The procedure of any
agency shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of this
chapter only as to those functions to which this chapter is
made applicable by the statutes relating to the partimdar
agency." (Emphasis in body of statute added.) As "included agencies'' are set forth the Department of Social
Welfare and the Social Welfare Board. It is our opinion
that the board's contention that the section means it is to
apply only when made applicable by the statutes relating
to the particular agency involved is meritorious. In different
sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the provisions
of the Government Code are made directly applicable (see
§§ 1624, 1625, 2304, 2305, 2355, 2356, all of which relate to
permits or licenses or revocation thereof, or supervision of
life-care contracts). It appears then that the board is correct
in its contention that sections 104.1 et seq. of the Welfare
and Institutions Code contain the controlling procedure.
Section 104.1 provides in part that any applicant or recipient for aid who is dissatisfied with the action of the
county board of supervisors ''shall . . . upon filing a petition
with the State Department of Social vVelfare, have the right
of appeal and shall be accorded an opportunity for a fair
hearing. The department shall set such appeal for hearing
before the State Social Welfare Board and shall give all
parties concerned written notice of the time and place of
such hearing.'' The applicant is to appear in person either
with or without counsel of his choice ; the board is to consider the appeal and either dismiss it or award aid in compliance with the terms of the code. Section 104.2 provides
that if such an applicant feels aggrieved by any decision of
the board, he may petition the superior court of the county
of his residence for a ''review of the entire proceedings in
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of law involved in the ea.se. Such
a distinct and cumulative remedy. The
State Social Welfare Board shall be the sole respondent in
added.) Section 104.5, subsuch
: "[Referee's report: Final Decision.]
is not heard by the board,
shall be prepared
the referee
together with any data the party
appealing may
shall be presented to the board for
final decision. Only the board may make such final decision."
Under section 11517, subdivisions (b) and (c), of the
Government Code, if the proposed decision of the hearing
officer is not
by the agency, "The agency itself may
decide the ease upon the record, including the transcript,
with or without taking additional evidence, or may refer
the case to the same or another hearing officer to take additional evidence . . . . The agency itself shall decide no case
provided for in this subdivision without affording the parties
the opportunity to present either oral or written argument
before the agency itself. If additional oral evidence is introduced before the agency itself no agency member may vote
unless he heard the additional oral evidence."
Petitioners contend that "unless he who hears decides"
(Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 [56 S.Ct. 906, 80
L.Ed. 1288]) there has been a denial of due process of law.
In Leeds v. Gray, 109 Cal.App.2d 874 [242 P.2d 48], the
petitioner was a referee of the Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board; charges were preferred against him. He had
a hearing before a hearing officer at which no board member
was present. The hearing officer made no findings, no decision or recommendation. The Personnel Board reviewed the
1ranscript of the proceedings and made certain findings, after
which he was ordered demoted. The court there said in
holding there had been no denial of due process: "Petitioner,
of course, was entitled to a fair and full hearing. The fact
that a fact finding tribunal does not see or hear the witnesses
does not in every instance constitute a denial of such hearing.
For example, many court proceedings are determined upon
affidavits. There the court neither sees nor hears the witnesses. A fair and full hearing is given where the fact finder
fully reviews the record and an opportunity is given the
parties to argue their contentions as to the credibility of
the witnesses and the other matters involved in the proceeding. This was done in our case by briefs. It is true that
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no proposed findings or decision were submitted to the parties
and no opportunity given to argue concerning them, but
where the board itself is passing on the record, fully considers it and the arguments presented, on the merits, there
is no requirement that the board permit further argument
on its proposed findings and decision, and no logical reason
therefor." (Pp. 883, 884.) (See California Shipbuilding
Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 27 Cal.2d 536 [165 P.2d 669] ;
Cooper v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal.2d 242
[217 P.2d 630, 18 A.L.R.2d 593] .) [2] It would appear
that under the situation here present where petitioners were
given a full opportunity to be heard before the hearing officer
whose report was then reviewed by the board, there was no
denial of procedural due process of law.
Petitioners next argue that they should have been given
a trial de novo in the superior court. In other words, it is
contended that the trial court should have based its decision
on the facts as well as the law. Petitioners rely upon Laisne
v. California State Board of Optometry, 19 Ca1.2d 831 [123
P.2d 457], and Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors
& Embalmers, 13 Cal.2d 75 [87 P.2d 848], for the proposition
that in reviewing an order of a statewide administrative
agency, the superior court must exercise its independent
judgment on the law and the facts where constitutional rights
are involved. The Drummey and Laisne cases stand for the
rule that an ''existing valuable privilege'' may not be taken
away by an administrative order without giving the person
so deprived the opportunity of having the finality of such
action passed upon by a court of law (13 Cal.2d 75, 84).
[3] Petitioners here were not possessed of a vested right,
but the right to make application for old age benefits provided that they were able to comply with the statutory prerequisites therefor (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 2160 et seq.) It
would appear, therefore, that petitioners were not entitled to
a trial de novo in the superior court.
Petitioners' major contention is that they are deprived of
old age benefits by reason of their membership in Christ's
Church of the Golden Rule and that such deprivation is a
denial of freedom of religion and a denial of equal protection
of the laws within the meaning of both the federal and state
Constitutions.
The Social Welfare Board found that when petitioners
joined the church they gave up all their worldly possessions
to promote its objects; that they have performed duties im-
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posed upon them as such
and that petitioners
received "full, complete, and adequate support from said''
church; and "That to the extent that any of the appellants
were in need within the meaning of the Old Age Security
Law, they were so as a result of a continuing voluntary
acceptance of lower standards of living in accordance with
their adherence to the precepts of Christ's Church of the
Golden Rule and their entrance into 'the religious apostolic
society form of living.' " Finding VI is "That all or a
major portion of any grant of Old Age Security made to
the appellants would not be devoted to meeting their individual and personal needs as those needs are defined by the
Welfare and Institutions Code and the Manual of Policies
and Procedures of the State Department of Social Welfare.
but would, on the contrary, be devoted systematically and
continuously to the adYancement of the objectives of Christ's
Church of the Golden Rule." Finding VII is "That none
of the appellants is or since ,January 20, 1948, has been under
any so-called 'life care' contract whereby gifts or transfer
of property were made to be used for the support, maintenance, or care of the donor thereof. ''
[4a] We said in County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente,
20 Cal.2d 870, 875 [129 P.2d 378], that the "'need' of the
applicant necessary to qualify for the benefits of the law is
defined by the Legislature to be the absence of actual receipt
of support by the applicant from responsible relatives and
by the property limitations of the law.'' Let us then look
to see how the law defines "need."
Section 2160, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), sets forth the age
and citizenship and residence requirements which are not here
involved or questioned. Section 2160 (e) provides in part:
"Persons who are inmates of a boarding home or other institution not supported in whole or in part by public funds shall
be granted aid but no such aid shall be granted if such
persons are cared for under a contract for a period of time
exceeding one month; . . . " Subsection (f) provides that
aid shall be granted to such an aged person "Who is not
receiving adequate support from a husband or wife, or child
able and responsible under the laws of this State to furnish
such support; free board and lodging supplied to an applicant,
because of his necessity, by a friend or relative who is not
responsible for his support, shall not be grounds for refusing
aid"; subsection (g) provides that aid shall be granted to
such an aged person "Who has not made any voluntary
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of property
the purpose of qualifying for such aid." (Emphasis added.) Section 2160.5 provides: "Notwithstanding any provision of subdivision (e)
of Section 2160 to the contrary, aid shall be granted to any
person who is an inmate of a home or institution maintained
any
or other nonprofit organization
if the organization has not been paid for the life care and
maintenance of the person through assessment of or dues of
said inmate or
whether or not the person has agreed
or promised to pay for his maintenance in the event that
he receives any pension, bequest, devise, or other inheritance.
"The county from which such inmate came to such home
shall, for the purposes of this section, be considered the residence of such inmate to grant such aid."
Sections 2163 et seq. set forth the amount of personal property which may be owned by persons otherwise eligible for
aid and the valuation of real property which if owned would
render such persons ineligible for aid. Section 2010 provides
that "No question, inquiry, or recommendation under the
authority of this chapter or the rules of the State Department
of Social Welfare shaJJ relate to the political or religious
opinions or afiiliations of any person, and no grant or denial
of aid under this chapter shall be in any manner affected
or influenced by such opinions or afiiliations." A specific
finding was made to the effect that this section had not been
violated by county or state officials.
Section 2020 provides that "The amount of aid to which
any applicant shall be entitled shall be, when added to the
income (including the value of currently used resources, but
excepting casual income and inconsequential resources) of
the applicant from all other sources, seventy-five dollars ($75)
per month. If, however, in any case it is found the actual
need of an applicant exceeds seventy-five dollars ($75) per
month, such applicant shall be entitled to receive aid in an
amount, not to exceed seventy-five dollars ($75) per month,
which when added to his income (including the value of
currently used resources, but excepting casual income and
inconsequential resources) from all other sources, shall equal
his actual need.''
There is no finding that petitioners made any voluntary
assignment or transfer of property for the purpose of qualifying for old age assistance (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 2160, subd.
(g)) ; there is no finding that petitioners are disqualified by
reason of owning either personal or real property in excess
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of the statutory valuations.
that
are
receiving full, complete and adequate support from their
church (if material) must be examined in the light of the
record which shows that they each receive from $16 to $18
per month in food, clothing and medicine. This is not denied
by the board. [5] The finding that any grant of old age
security benefits would not be devoted to the
needs
of the applicants but to the work of the church (if material)
does not appear to be supported by the record: many testified
that they needed clothing, or medicine. or proper food, or
special diets, or dentures, hearing aids, etc. which they were
not receiving from the church. We find nothing in the record,
nor does the board point to any provision in the Welfare
and Institutions Code which places any limitation on the
use for which, or to which, money received under the act
must be put. As a matter of fact, the board's Manual of
Policies and Procedures. section A 140, provides: "No provision of the 0. A. S. Law requires or purports to require
that income received by any person, whether a recipient of
aid or one who has been a recipient of aid, shall be expended
by that person for particular purposes or in particular
amounts." [6] If the applicants are otherwise qualified
for benefits under the act, it would appear completely immaterial and irrelevant for what the money is spent. If they
choose to turn it over to a religious institution in return
for which they receive care at a lower level than if all the
money -were spent for food, clothing and the like, is the board
to place a monetary value on the satisfaction such applicants
may receive in having their spiritual needs fulfilled? If an
applicant receives $75 per month and gives $50 of it each
month to the Catholic or any Protestant church, is the aid
to cease because considered unnecessary? We would think
not.
[7] Petitioners are under no contract for life care with
the Church of the Golden Rule; they are free to leave the
church whenever they desire. 'l'he seminary in which they
live is not supported in whole or in part with public funds.
It appears to us that as a matter of law, petitioners come
directly within the provisions of section 2160.5 >vhich provides
that aid shall be granted to any person who is an inmate
of a home or institution maintained by any benevolent ''or
other nonprofit organization if the organization has not been
paid for the life care and maintenance of the person through
assessment of or dues of said inmate or otherwise, whether
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or not the person has agreed or promised to pay for his
maintenance in the event that he receives any pension, bequest,
devise, or other inheritance." In addition, they are not
receiving assistance from any legally responsible relative
(W elf. & Inst. Code, § 2160, subd. (f)).
The board makes much of the fact that when the church
corporation was organized in 1944 as a nonprofit organization,
all members turned over all their property to the corporation
which purchased various business organizations therewith in
which all members able to work were required to do so. This
corporation went through bankruptcy in 1945. In 1946, some
of the original members, including petitioners, organized a
'' nonincorporated association'' and had released to themselves
certain of the commercial projects which had been operated
by the bankrupt corporation. [8] It is apparently the
board's position that the income from the various enterprises
is sufficient to support, adequately, the petitioners. A complete answer to this contention is that whether or not $16
or $18 per month is adequate support, the church is not oblir;ated to provide it. The code (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 2160,
sub d. (e)) provide;;; that ".Aid shall be granted under this
chapter to any person . . . (f) Who is not receiving adequate
support from a husband or wife, or c.hil.d able and responsible
under the laws of this State to furnish such support; free
board and lodging sttpplied to an appZ.icant. becanse of his
necessity, by a friend or relative who is not responsible for
his support, shall not be ground for refusing aid." (Emphasis
added.) [4b] As we said in the r~a Fuente case (20 Cal.2d
870, 875) " . . . the 'need' of the applicant necessary to
qualify for the benefits of the law is defined by the Legislature
to be the absence of actual receipt of support by the applicant
from responsible relatives and by the property limitations
of the law." [9] We also said (p. 876) "Both the letter
and the spirit of the Old Age Security Law clearly show that
only the receipt of support from responsible relatives should
render the applicant ineligible for benefits under it.''
[10] The board argues that if old age benefits are paid
to these petitioners it would be, in fact. a grant of aid to a
religious sect and unconstitutional as a gift of public funds.
We held in County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, supra, 20
Cal.2d 870, 876, 877, that the care and relief of aged persons
who are in need is a special matter of state concern and
that the enactment of the Old Age Security Law, based upon
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a broad social
did not constitute a
public
money within the constitutional prohibition.
[11] The board argues that the question of "need" rs
one of fact for the board and cites Newbold v. Soeial
Board, 76 Cal.App.2d 844 [174 P.2d 482], and
State Board of Social Welfare, 82
627 [ 186 P .2d
429], in support of the statement. '\Vith ihis statement there
can be no argument. However, the
has seen fit
to set the standard of need and the board mnst act in accord
ance with the statutory definition. We have heretofore discussed the statutory requirements to be met by persons applying for old age assistance and it appears to us that petitioners.
so far as can be ascertained, meet those requirements.
It is our opinion that the findings that petitioners
are receiving adequate support from Christ's Church of the
Golden Rule and that they are in need because of their "voluntary acceptance of the lower standards of living" prescribed
by the church, as well as the finding that all, or a major
portion, of any aid received would be devoted to the church
are immaterial when considered in the light of the applicable
statutes as heretofore set forth and discussed.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-The majority opinion concedes, as it must, that "the question of 'need' is one of fact
for the board [Social Welfare J" but avoids the board's
finding by holding that "the Legislature has seen fit to set
the standard of need'' and that petitioners as a matter of
law come within the preseribed standard. Certainly I agree
that the Legislature has, within limits, set the standard,
but in respect to the fact question as to whether the petitioners, upon the record, as a matter of law fall within that
standard, I agree with the Social Welfare Board and with
the superior court rather than with the majority. In my view
the majority opinion unduly extends the concept of ''need''
which is basic to the philosophy and required by the letter
of the statutes governing the granting of old age security.
The opinion relies, among other things, upon isolated statements from Cmlnty of Los A.ngeles v. La Fuente (1942)
20 Cal.2d 870 [129 P.2d 378], a ease which dealt with a situation materially different from that presented here, and which
is hereinafter discussed.
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The law which
of aid by the state
to the
has since its
be<'n b"'''d upon the concept
of need. It was provided by Stats. 1929, ch. 530, p. 914, § 1,
as it is now
by section 2001 of the 'vVelfare and Institutions Code, that residents of the state are entitled to aid
in old age ''if in need.'' The petitioners here. accordingto the findings of the State Socia I Welfare Board, and of
the superior court, are not in need. In accord with their
beliefs they have transferred all their property to Christ's
Church of the Goldfm Rule. They all perform tasks, according to their abilities, at the theological seminary. In accord
with the canon law of the church. "A" the material needs of
the various persons and their families and dependents must
of necessity be met to permit these persons to dedicate their
work, services, and studies to carry out the religious purposes
of the ecclesiastical society, thr religious apostolic society form
of living is selected as the means to accomplish thesP results
. . '' and ''The ecclesiastical Church GoYernment shall determine how much is necessary for the common community
treasury to carry out the religious purposes through the
apostolic society form of living." The petitioners subscribe
10 these tenets.
The board has further found that petitioners ''are now
receiving, full, complete, and adequate support including
incidental expenses from said Christ's Church of the Golden
Rule, of which they are membrrs, through the Elected Delegates Committee, a temporal agency of said Christ's Church
of the Golden Rule in accordance with their needs as they
and the said Christ's Church determined them to exist'' ;
''That to the extent that any of the appellants were in need
within the meaning of the Old Age Srcurity Law. they were
so as a result of a continuing voluntary acceptance of lower
standards of living in accordance with their adherence to
the precepts of Christ's Church of the Golden Rule and their
entrance into 'the religious apostolic society form of living' ";
and ''That all or a major portion of any grant of Old Age
Security made to the appellants would not be devoted to
meeting their individual and personal needs as those needs
are definrd by the Welfare aml Institutions Code and the
Manual of Policies and Procedures of the State Department
of Social Welfare. but would. on the contrary, be devoted
systematically and continuously to the advancement of the
objectives of Christ's Church of the Golden Rule."
It thus appears that although petitioners do not have en-
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contracts for
material
needs, they do in
in accord with the canon
which
they continue to espouse, receive such needs.
In County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942), supra,
20 Cal.2d 870, this court afflrmed a judgment for plaintiff
county for reimbursement for old age benefits furnished to
the parents of defendant. It was shown that defendant was
financially able to contribute to the support of her parents.
The parents had refused the child's offer to support them
in her home. It was held (p. 875 of 20 Cal.2d) that this
refusal of support in the home did not render the parents
ineligible for old age assistance.
In the La Fuente case it is said (as stated at [ante,
p. 533] of the majority opinion) that "the 'need' of the applicant necessary to qualify for the benefits of the law is defined by the Legislature to be the absence of actual receipt of
support by the applicant from responsible relatives [those
who, according to law, owe a duty of support] and by the
property limitations of the law" (p. 875 of 20 Cal.2d). But
this statement should be considered in the context in which
it was made; i.e., in a case where this court was considering,
in effect, whether aged parents should be deprived of old
age assistance because they preferred to maintain their own
home with such aid rather than to be forced to accept the
offer of an inharmonious residence with their child. If the
quoted statement from the La Fuente case is read literally
out of context, then every aged person in the state who has
no relatives liable for his support, and whose property is
less than that stated in sections 2163 and 2164 of the ·welfare
and Institutions Code, is entitled to old age assistance regardless of his income. Such is not the law. (See Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 2020: "The amount of aid to which any applicant
shall be entitled shall be, when added to the income (including
the value of currently used resources, but excepting casual
income and inconsequential resources) of the applicant from
all other sources, eighty-five dollars ( $85) per month. If,
however, in any case it is found the actual need of an applicant
exceeds eighty-five dollars ($85) per month, such applicant
shall be entitled to receive aid in an amount, not to exceed
eighty-five dollars ($85) per month, which when added to
his income (including the value of currently used resources,
but excepting casual income and inconsequential resources)
from all other sources, shall equal his actual need.") Thus
•• actual need'' and ''income ••• from all other sources'' are
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elements integral to the legislative plan; being integral to
the plan, it seems essential that the agency charged with its
administration shall have power within the scope of the plan
to make the practical factual determinations incidental to
its application.
Some argument has been advanced to the effect that petitioners are being deprived of a right to dispose of their state
aid as they may see fit. There is no such holding either by
the administrative agency or the superior court. The argument begs the question by assuming that petitioners are
entitled as a matter of law to receive the aid. Until and
unless they become entitled to receive it, they should not be
heard to argue a right to dispose of it. We therefore need
not consider an opposing argument suggesting the profits
which might be garnered by a smooth-talking promoter who
under the guise of religious, political or social theme could
sell old persons on a plan of contributing $85 a month to
the ''Master,'' together with such personal services as they
were able to render, all for a roof and keep on frugal scale.
These petitioners have elected to live modestly in their
communal, religious fashion; they are enjoying the material,
social and spiritual compensations which they find therein.
In my view, the finding of the board, in substance, made on
substantial evidence, that they have voluntarily accepted
such a standard and circumstances of living as fulfilling their
needs, and hence are not persons in need, is not, as held in
the majority opinion [ante, p. 534] immaterial, but is vital
and determinative. I would affirm the judgment.
Shenk, J ., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December
14, 1955. Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

